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1 Introduction
This paper is related to two puzzles in pupils' success at school. First, in most OECD countries, a
persistent achievement gap exists between boys and girls at the earliest stage of schooling. Boys
tend to outperform girls in mathematics, whilst the opposite is observed in languages (Fryer and
Levitt 2010, OECD 2009)1. Second, in many countries girls catch up with boys in mathematics
over the years, so that the aforementioned achievement gap vanishes. In French however, boys
do not catch up and girls tend to keep their advance. This opposite pattern implies that in
many countries, by the end of secondary school, girls outperform boys at school2. These puzzles
raise two questions: how to explain the early achievement gap between boys and girls ? Why
does it seem to vanish in math but persist in humanities?
This paper sheds new light on gender biases in teachers' grades and provides evidence on the
impact of such biases on pupils' progress. Gender gaps in achievement are of particular concern
since they might cause greater subsequent inequalities in tracks chosen, subjects of study at
university, and wages (Heckman et al. 2006). In an eﬀort to understand the origins of these
gender inequalities, research has proven that teachers' stereotypes aﬀect their pupils' success,
notably because stereotypes can bias teachers' assessment and grades (Bar and Zussman 2012,
Burgess and Greaves 2009, Hanna and Linden 2012). In mathematics, teachers have often been
thought to have negative stereotypes towards girls. Girls would be less competitive than boys,
less logical, less adventurous and would rely more on eﬀort than on ability to succeed (Tiedemann
2000, Fennema and Peterson 1985, Fennema et al. 1990).
A number of papers have shown that girls beneﬁt from grade discrimination (Lindhal 2007,
Lavy 2008, Robinson and Lubienski 2011, Falch and Naper 2013, Cornwell et al. 2013). Most of
these results are based on a comparison between blind scores and teachers grades, a methodology
introduced in a seminal paper by Lavy (2008). Yet, there is no clear consensus in the existing
literature. Some papers ﬁnd no gender discrimination (Hinnerich et al. 2011). Ouazad and
Page (2013) and Dee (2007) observe that gender discrimination depends on teachers' gender,
while Breda and Ly (2012) ﬁnd that discrimination depends on the degree to which the subject
is male-connoted. Besides the inconclusive nature of this literature, most previous papers are
not able to disentangle a pure gender bias from a discrimination related to pupils' behavior.
Hence the risk of biased estimates due to omitted variables. A contribution of this paper is to
1International comparative studies of educational achievement provide evidence of this early gender gap. In
the 2011 TIMSS assessment of mathematical knowledge of 4th grade pupils, of the 24 countries with a statistically
signiﬁcant gender diﬀerence, 20 had diﬀerences favoring boys  among which the United States, Finland, Norway,
Austria, Korea, Germany and Italy. Regarding reading and writing, in nearly all of the 45 countries participating
to the PIRLS assessment, 4th grade girls outperformed boys in the reading achievement in 2011.
2In math, TIMSS assessments have shown gender diﬀerences in achievement to favor boys on average at the
fourth grade, but to disappear or favor girls at the eighth grade, although the situation varies considerably from
country to country. On the contrary, recent research in the United States ﬁnds that girls have an advantage in
reading at all grades from kindergarten through the eighth grade (Robinson and Lubienski 2011,), and PISA 2009
reports that 15-year-old girls perform consistently better in reading than boys (Machin and Pekkarinen 2008,
OECD 2009).
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address this concern.
Another key question is whether grade discrimination aﬀects pupils' progress. There is
very little research measuring the eﬀects of gender biases on pupils' subsequent progress. All
prior research have focused on potential mechanisms through which discrimination could aﬀect
progress. Jussim and Eccles (1992) study how teachers' expectations inﬂuence student achieve-
ment through self-fulﬁlling prophecies. Positive biases could also reduce `stereotype threats'.
The latter arise when girls or minority groups perform poorly for the sole reason that they fear
conﬁrming the stereotype that their group performs poorly (Steele and Aronson 1995, Hoﬀ and
Pandey 2006). The apprehension it causes might disrupt women's math performance (Spencer et
al. 1999). Therefore, over-grading girls can reduce their anxiety to be judged as poor performers
when they undergo a math exam. Additionally, teacher-assigned grades have been proven to
aﬀect students' math self-concept and interest (Trautwein et al. 2006, Marsh and Craven, 1997),
which can aﬀect their achievement (Bonesronning, 2008). Finally, Mechtenberg (2009) provides
a theoretical model of how biased grading at school can explain gender diﬀerences in achieve-
ments3. The link between biased grading and pupils' achievement has long been an important
research question in education sciences, but not in economics. To my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst
paper to provide empirical evidence on how grade discrimination aﬀects pupils' progress over
the short and long-term, along with a contemporaneous and independent study by Lavy and
Sand (2015)4.
I use a rich student-level dataset produced by Avvisati et al. (2014). Three features make
this dataset unique. Firstly it includes two diﬀerent measures of a pupil's ability: a `blind' score
and a `non-blind' score. This enables me to identify the gender bias. 4490 pupils in 6th grade
were required to take a standardized test at the beginning and at the end of the year. These
tests were graded anonymously by an external corrector. They can be considered as blind scores
free of any teachers' stereotypes. In addition to these blind scores, grades attributed by teachers
were collected during the school year  hence non-blind and potentially aﬀected by teachers'
stereotypes. As long as both blind and non-blind scores measure the same skills, the blind score
can be considered as the counterfactual measure to the non-blind score. A second advantage of
this dataset is that it contains extensive information on pupils' behavior in the classroom. This
allows me to disentangle grade favoritism related to gender from favoritism related to pupils'
behavior. Finally, the third key feature of these data is that we can follow pupils over time.
Blind scores are available at three diﬀerent periods: beginning and end of the 6th grade, and
end of the 9th grade. Information is also available on pupils' course choice during high school.
This gives me the unique opportunity to study the impact of gender discrimination on pupils'
progress (over the short and long-term) and course choice.
3School results are deﬁned as a combination of talent and eﬀort, the latter being the channel through which
grade discrimination could aﬀect future cognitive achievement.
4Lavy and Sand (2015) analyze a similar question by using the diﬀerence between teachers in the degree of
stereotypical attitude, and the conditional random assignment of pupils to classes to identify the eﬀect of teachers'
attitudes on boys and girls progress separately.
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I use a double-diﬀerences (DiD) strategy to identify the existence of gender biases in grades.
Discrimination is deﬁned as the average gap between non-blind and blind scores for girls, minus
this same gap for boys. Prior research has used this method to estimate gender discrimination
(Falch and Naper 2013, Breda and Ly 2012, Lavy 2008, Goldin and Rouse 2000, Blank 1991).
Overall I ﬁnd strong evidence for a substantial bias in favor of girls in math, representing 0.31
points of the s.d. No discrimination is observed in French. Controlling for pupils' punishment
does not aﬀect signiﬁcantly the estimate so that the gender discrimination does not capture a
good behavior bias. However, controlling for pupils' achievement at the beginning of the year
slightly decreases the gender bias in math, due to the fact that girls perform lower than boys in
this subject, and that low performers tend to be favored by teachers. These results are robust to
a variety of alternative speciﬁcations that account for the fact that the blind and the non-blind
scores might not measure the same abilities, that they are not ﬁlled in at the same date, and
ﬁnally that girls might be more stressed than boys for national evaluations. These ﬁndings shed
new light on the role of girls' behavior in teachers' gender bias. They tend to conﬁrm existing
studies which ﬁnd that girls are favored by teachers in math (Falch and Naper 2013, Breda and
Ly 2012).
Then, based on the preceding robust estimation of teachers' biases, I focus my analysis on
the eﬀect of these biases on girls' progress and course choice, compared to boys. The identiﬁ-
cation strategy, based on class level data, exploits the high variation in teachers' discriminatory
behavior: not all teachers favor girls, and among those who have a biased assessment of girls
relative to boys, some are more biased than others. Taking advantage of both this heterogene-
ity and the quasi-random assignment of pupils to teachers who discriminate, the identiﬁcation
stems from a comparison of the relative progress of girls (as compared to boys) in classes where
the teacher displays a high degree of discrimination, to the progress of girls in classes where the
teacher does not discriminate much.
The key ﬁnding is that classes in which girls beneﬁt from a high degree of positive discrimi-
nation are also classes in which girls progress more (relative to boys) during the 6th grade and
over the long term. Girls perform initially lower than boys in math but catch up during the 6th
grade. I ﬁnd that the reduction of this achievement gap between boys and girls is entirely driven
by teachers discriminatory behavior. Over the longer term, half of catching up is explained
by teachers' biases. Additionally, I ﬁnd that gender discrimination aﬀects girls course choice
compared to boys. Girls are relatively more likely to attend a general high school (rather than a
professional or technical one), and to chose scientiﬁc courses in high school. All together, these
results show that positively rewarding pupils has the potential to aﬀect their progress and course
choice. This is consistent with two mechanisms mentioned in prior literature. In math, favoring
girls can reduce the stereotype threat they suﬀer from, and hence reduce their apprehension
when ﬁlling in an exam. This could explain why, over the short term, biases aﬀect girls' relative
progress in math but not in French, a subject in which girls might suﬀer less from stereotypes
threats. Positive biases can also aﬀect girls' interest and self-conﬁdence in a subject. However,
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my results tend to challenge Mechtenberg's (2009) theoretical predictions according to which,
due to their awareness of receiving biased grading, girls would be reluctant to internalize good
grades in math.
Taken together, these results build upon an important literature suggesting that teachers'
grades are biased. My ﬁndings conﬁrm the existence of such biases, but more importantly
they highlight that gender discrimination can have long-lasting eﬀects on girls' human capital
accumulation relative to boys. I provide a new explanation for the fact that the achievement
gap vanishes in math but persists in French. This is particularly relevant for the ongoing debate
about policies aimed at promoting gender equality at school. Advocates of such policies usually
focus their argumentation on the fact that teachers' grades can be a source of inequalities at
school. My ﬁndings bring this argument one step further by highlighting that, over the long term,
teachers' biases can also play a large and lasting role in the reduction of the gender achievement
gap at school.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the dataset and gives some descriptive
statistics. Section 3 deﬁnes a simple model of grade attribution, discusses the identiﬁcation of
gender discrimination in grades, and presents the results. Section 4 presents a model of pupils'
progress, discusses the identiﬁcation of the causal eﬀect, and presents the results. Section 5
concludes.
2 Data
2.1 The dataset
I address the question of teachers' assessment bias by using a French dataset which contains
35 secondary schools, 191 classes, and 4490 pupils in 6th grade, hence 11 years old. Three
features of this dataset are particularly interesting for this study. First, this dataset provides
two diﬀerent sources of information on pupils' achievements. The ﬁrst one is the score obtained
by students to a standardized test they complete at the beginning of the school year. This
test has been created by the French Education Ministry and is taken every year by all French
pupils who enter the 6th grade in order to assess their cognitive skills. It is identical across
schools and tests knowledge on French and mathematics. The important feature of this test is
that it is externally graded so that the grader has no information on the name, gender, social
background or school attended by pupils. Hence, these scores may safely be assumed to be free
of any bias caused by stereotypes from an external examiner. The second source of information
on children' achievement is provided by teachers' assessment of their own pupils. A pupil has
a diﬀerent teacher in each subject and all teachers report pupils' average grade on end-of-term
report cards. In this study, I focus on mathematics and French grades given during the ﬁrst and
last term of the school year. In so far as teachers have permanent contacts with the pupils they
teach, these average grades may reﬂect biases from teachers' gender stereotypes. Thus, I have
two diﬀerent scores that measure students' knowledge. I use the term "blind scores" to describe
4
test scores that have been anonymously graded. When grades have been given by teachers who
know pupils' gender and identity, I describe them as "non-blind scores"5.
The second interesting feature of this dataset is that it contains a rich set of measures of
pupils' behavior for each of the three school terms. I have information on whether pupils were
given an oﬃcial disciplinary warning, whether they were deﬁnitively excluded from the school,
temporarily excluded from the school or from the class, whether they were put in detention or
received blâmes6. Temporary exclusions signal violent behavior or repeated transgressions of
the rules. They are decided by the school head. All these sanctions can be cumulated by pupils.
The third key aspect of this dataset is that we can follow pupils over time: blind scores and
schooling decisions are available several years after the sixth grade. This enables me to estimate
the eﬀect of the gender bias on pupils' progress and course choice. Regarding progress, a pupil's
achievement is measured by blind scores at the end of the 6th grade and at end of the 9th grades
(on top of the blind score given at the entrance of grade 6). The test completed at the end of
grade 6 is extremely similar to the one pupils take when they enter grade 6. The knowledge
tested are similar and the properties of this test are the same as described above : created by
the French Education Ministry, identical across schools, externally graded. Then, at the end of
grade 9, which is also the end of lower secondary school, all pupils have to take a national exam
to obtain the 'Diplome national du brevet'. This externally graded score constitutes the ﬁnal
blind measure of pupils' ability in this study7. Finally, additionally to these scores, information
is available on pupils' schooling decisions and course choice in high school. The 9th grade
corresponds to the last grade of the lower (and compulsory) secondary school. After this grade,
pupils can chose between the vocational, technical or general training. For those who decide to
follow a general training, pupils have to specialize when they enter the 11th grade, by choosing
one of the three following options: sciences, humanities or economics and social sciences. I use
this information to estimate the eﬀect of teachers' gender biases on three outcomes : pupils'
probability to undergo a general training, to follow scientiﬁc courses, and to repeat a grade.
Information on pupils' long-term outcomes comes from the statistical department of the French
ministry of education. It has been merged to the initial dataset. An analysis of the attrition is
done in section 4.4. Overall, respectively 18.9% and 19.6% of the French and math scores are
missing at the end of the 9th grade. For 20.9% of the pupils, we do not have information on
their course choice during the 11th grade.
5It is worth mentioning that the standardized tests are high-stakes for neither the students nor the teachers.
For students, they are a pure administrative evaluation aimed at reporting pupils' average achievement by schools
to the Ministry. For teachers, their evaluations or salaries do not depend on their pupils' results to these tests so
that they have no incentive to `teach to the test'. The standardized tests are also taken in the same conditions
as ordinary class exams: pupils ﬁll in the test in their usual classroom and their teacher gives the instructions.
Only the content of the tests diﬀer, an issue that I will discuss further in the paper.
6Blâmes are oﬃcial warnings given by the school's administration when a pupil behaves badly in a repeated
way.
7It is worth mentioning that contrary the 6th grade blind scores, the 9th grade score is high-stake for the
pupils.
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Finally, the dataset contains information on teachers' gender, birth date and years of ex-
perience, as well as administrative information on children: gender, parents' profession, grade
retention and birth date. The schools included in this dataset are mostly located in deprived
areas. Therefore they are not representative of all French pupils, an issue that I will discuss in
a further section.
2.2 Descriptive statistics and balance check of attrition
The dataset contains 4490 pupils. The ﬁrst column of table 1 presents descriptive statistics.
48.1% of the pupils in this sample are girls and 68.6% have low SES parents, which is consistent
with the fact that most schools in this study are located in the deprived administrative area of
Creteil. Regarding attrition, for 526 pupils (11.7%), one or more test score is missing during
ﬁrst term so that the sample is unbalanced. Missing scores might be blind or non-blind scores,
in math or French. The sample of pupils with no missing grades in math and French contains
3964 observations  4068 in math only and 4058 in French. In order to test if pupils with one or
more missing variables are diﬀerent from those with no missing variables, I implement a balance
check of the attrition and compare several characteristics across both groups of pupils. Results
are presented in table 1.
Pupils for which one or more test score is missing have diﬀerent characteristics from pupils
with no variable missing. They have systematically lower test scores in both blind and non-blind
scores. For instance, in French during ﬁrst term, their blind score is on average 0.283 points
lower. There are also 7.9 percentage points fewer girls in the sample with missing variables, and
pupils' seem to have a slightly worst behavior. Parents belong less to high or low SES, hence we
can expect parents being more middle class.
Considering these diﬀerences, analyzing discrimination with the sole balanced sample is not
satisfactory. Although this sample allows comparing results obtained with the same subset of
pupils, it might yield results that suﬀer from a selection bias, hence being non-representative
of the whole sample. In the remaining of the paper, I systematically run regressions on both
samples: the sample of 3964 observations with no missing variable and the one with the maximum
number of observations (4490) but some variables missing. Every time results diﬀer, I will point
it out.
2.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 and density graphics present statistical diﬀerences between boys' and girls' scores. In
the remaining of the paper, all descriptive statistics and analysis are performed on standardized
test scores  mean zero and variance equal one. Standardization is done within score (blind and
non-blind), subject and term.
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Graphics 1 and 2 display distributions of blind and non-blind scores during the ﬁrst term
in French. In this subject, girls strongly outperform boys, and this premium is not aﬀected
by the nature of the grade (blind or non-blind). As reported in table 2, girls' average score is
0.434 points higher than boys when the score is blind and 0.460 when it is non-blind. However,
the story is diﬀerent in mathematics. Figures 3 and 4 show that boys outperform girls when
grades are blind, but the opposite is observed when teachers assess their pupils. Hence, girls'
average score during ﬁrst term is 0.147 points lower than boys when the score is blind but it is
0.170 points higher when it is non-blind. Graphically, a clear shift to the right of girls' score
distribution is observed (relative to boys) when comparing blind and non-blind scores in math.
Graphics 5 to 10 present girls' and boys' evolution of blind scores between the beginning
and the end of the 6th grade, hence capturing their relative progress. In math, the initial boys`
premium vanishes between the ﬁrst and last term of the 6th grade. Girls progress more than
boys so that, by the end of the year, the average gap between boys' and girls' scores in math is no
more statistically signiﬁcant. Three years later, by the end of 9th grade, girls at the bottom of
the distribution are even performing better than boys. The average achievement gap represents
0.058 points and is in favor of girls. One of the objectives of this paper is to determine whether
part of this catching up is the result of encouragement generated by grade bias in favor of girls.
In French, no clear diﬀerence in progress between boys and girls is observed.
3 Gender discrimination in grades
3.1 Model of grade attribution
I deﬁne a simple model to describe how blind and non-blind scores are attributed. The main
assumption of this model is that blind scores are free of any bias, and should only measure
pupils' ability, whereas non-blind scores can be aﬀected by teacher's stereotypes towards boys
or girls. Hence, blind scores are modeled as a function of a pupil's ability only:
Bi = θ1i + iB (1)
Here θ1i is a pupil's ability, Bi is a noisy measure of a pupil's ability, and iB corresponds to
an individual random shock speciﬁc to blind scores. This might capture any eﬀect that makes a
pupil overperform or underperform the day of the exam and can be interpreted as measurement
error. Non-blind scores can be aﬀected by teachers' beliefs towards pupils' gender. Hence, they
can be modeled as a function of both ability and pupils' gender:
NBi = α0 + θ2i + α2Gi + iNB (2)
Here θ2i is the pupil's ability that is measured by the non-blind test. Gi is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 for girls. α2 is the coeﬃcient representing the potential gender related
7
discrimination. The constant α0 represents the average gap for boys between the non-blind
score and the ability (NBi − θ2i). iNB is an individual shock speciﬁc to grades attributed
by teachers. This noise might capture pupils' behavior for instance. Finally, I allow θ1i and
θ2i to diﬀer, meaning that abilities measured by blind and non-blind scores might diﬀer. The
relationship between both abilities can be modeled as follows:
θ2i = ρθ1i + vi (3)
Where vi captures variables that potentially aﬀect ability measured by class exams θ2i, once
controlled for ability measured by blind score θ1i. Any speciﬁc ability measured by class exams
but not by standardized tests, would be captured by vi. I discuss further in the next section the
importance of diﬀerentiating abilities measured by both tests. Ability measured by blind scores
(θ1i) might include pupils' long-term memory and their ability to synthesize knowledge acquired
in the last few months, while ability measured by non-blind scores (θ2i) might integrate more
short-term skills such as learning an exercise by heart and replicating it the day after for the
class exam. Any diﬀerence between θ1i and θ2i could bias the identiﬁcation of discrimination.
If the blind and the non-blind scores measure slightly diﬀerent abilities, and if boys or girls are
more endowed in one of these abilities, then the coeﬃcient α2 of gender would not only measure
a potential discrimination, but also the diﬀerence in ability distribution between boys and girls.
This way of modeling blind and non-blind scores is highly simpliﬁed and relies on two im-
portant hypotheses. Firstly, I suppose a linear relation between non-blind scores, ability and
gender. Secondly, I assume that non-blind scores do not depend on blind scores in this spec-
iﬁcation. This hypothesis is likely to be satisﬁed in our context because blind tests were not
corrected by teachers but by independent correctors.
The reduced form of this structural model is obtained by replacing θ2i by its formula in
equation (2):
NBi = α0 + ρθ1i + α2Gi + (iNB + vi) (4)
Replacing θ1i by (Bi − iB) gives the ﬁnal reduced form:
NBi = α0 + ρBi + α2Gi + (iNB + vi − ρiB) (5)
It is worth mentioning that this model could be used to study other sources of discrimination.
For instance, biases in grades related to pupils' behavior, their academic level or their social
background could be studied by replacing Gi by other interesting variables in equation (5).
3.2 Identiﬁcation strategy for discrimination
To identify a potential gender bias in grades, I ﬁrst use a double-diﬀerences strategy. This
methodology has been introduced in a seminal paper by Lavy (2008) and widely used by later
papers to estimate discrimination: Falch and Naper (2013), Breda and Li (2012), Goldin and
Rouse (2000) and Blank (1991). The strategy consists of estimating the diﬀerence between
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boys' and girls' average gap between the non-blind and the blind scores. In the absence of
teachers' biases in grades, and under the assumption that both tests measure the same abilities,
the diﬀerence between the non-blind score and the blind score should be the same for boys and
girls. This corresponds to the common trend identiﬁcation hypothesis. Implementing a double
diﬀerence controls for the average eﬀect of non-blind grading on scores, for the average eﬀect
of being a girl on score, so that what the double diﬀerence captures is the speciﬁc eﬀect of the
grade being non-blind on girls scores, relative to boys.
One of the advantages of the reduced form equation (5) is that it is compatible with an
identiﬁcation based on double-diﬀerences, provided that the following assumptions are made:
blind and non-blind scores are assumed to measure the same abilities, so that θ2i = θ1i = θi.
In equation (5) this is equivalent to ρ = 1 and vi = 0. This hypothesis is often implicitly made
in other papers. I make it clear here, and will discuss its robustness in a further section, by
analyzing the identiﬁcation of discrimination in the more general setup where both tests do not
measure the same abilities. To begin with, I consider this assumption as valid, so that equation
(5) is equivalent to the usual double-diﬀerences equation:
NBi −Bi = α0 + α2Gi + (iNB − iB) (6)
A more common formulation of this DiD speciﬁcation is written below. The estimates ob-
tained for discrimination are similar but equation (7) has the advantage of providing coeﬃcients
for the gender eﬀect and the non-blind eﬀect:
Scoin = α+ βGi + γNBi + α2(Gi ∗NBi) + pic + in (7)
Here Scoin is the grade received by a pupil when the nature of scoring is n (n=1 for non-
blind and 0 for blind). Hence, for each pupil, this dependent variable is a vector of both blind
and non-blind grades received. Gi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the pupil is a girl. NBi
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the score has been given non-anonymously by a teacher.
The coeﬃcient I am interested in is the coeﬃcient α2 of the interaction term which identiﬁes
gender discrimination. Finally, pic is a class ﬁxed-eﬀect aimed at capturing elements aﬀecting
grades in a given class: teachers' severity for instance, or student/teacher ratio, peers eﬀects. . .
In further speciﬁcations, additional control variables will be added such as pupils' behavior,
parents' profession, or pupils' initial level.
3.3 Empirical results on discrimination
Table 3 presents the coeﬃcient estimates of equation (7). Two diﬀerent regressions are
run in math (columns 1 and 3) and French (columns 2 and 4). In all speciﬁcations, standard
errors are estimated with school level clusters to take into account common shocks at the school
level. I ﬁnd that in math, the coeﬃcient of the interaction term Girl*Non-Blind is high and
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signiﬁcant - 0.31 points of the s.d - meaning that girls beneﬁt from a positive discrimination in
this subject. This result suggests that the extent of the bias is important: girls' non-blind scores
are on average 6.2% higher than boys in math during ﬁrst term due to discrimination. Using
the balanced sample or the full sample does not change the results much. In addition, in French
the coeﬃcient of the interaction term is neither high nor signiﬁcant, meaning that no gender
bias is observed in this subject.
These results conﬁrm up to a point what Lavy (2008) observes in his analysis: in opposition
to what common beliefs about girls' discrimination would predict, the biases observed are in
favor of girls. Similarly, Robinson and Lubienski (2011) ﬁnd that teachers in elementary and
middle schools consistently rate females higher than males in both math and reading, even when
cognitive assessments suggest that males have an advantage. Contrary to both previous studies,
I ﬁnd a bias only in math and not in all subjects. The results of Breda and Ly (2012) are
also consistent with my estimates. They ﬁnd that discrimination goes in favor of females in
more male-connoted subjects (e.g Math). Results decomposed by teachers' characteristics are
provided in Appendix A.
I try now to understand why the gender bias is in favor of girls. Any characteristics of pupils
that would inﬂuence teachers' grades and would not be equally distributed between boys and
girls, could potentially explain teachers' bias in favor of girls. Typically, pupils' behavior in the
class, pupils' initial achievement or having repeated a grade are three characteristics that could
(consciously or not) inﬂuence teachers' attributed grades and are diﬀerent for boys and girls. I
successively test if each of these three characteristics explains the bias in favor of girls.
Controlling for pupils' behavior. If a bad behavior inﬂuences teachers' assessment (con-
sciously or not), since boys behave worse than girls, this could aﬀect the gender bias.8 As far
as I know, previous studies were not able to disentangle the `pure' gender discrimination from
a discrimination related to girls' better behavior than boys.9 This is one of the contributions of
this paper.
I create a variable Punishment that is a proxy for a pupil's bad behavior. It takes the value
1 if a pupil has received a disciplinary warning from the class council during ﬁrst term or if he/she
was temporarily excluded from the school. During the ﬁrst term 8% of pupils received at least
one sanction: 6.2% received a disciplinary warning and 3.6% were temporarily excluded from the
school. Boys are punished more than girls: among pupils having at least one sanction during the
ﬁrst term, 85% are boys. Several schools did not provide information on their pupils' behavior,
so that the punishment variable is missing for many pupils. Therefore, following regressions will
8In equation (6), without any controls for pupils' punishment, the latter would enter the error term, and would
be correlated with the gender variable.
9Cornwell et al. (2013), using data from the 1998-99 ECLS-K cohort of primary school pupils, take into account
pupils' non cognitive skills to explain why "boys who perform equally as well as girls on reading, math and science
tests are graded less favorably by their teachers." More speciﬁcally, the authors use teachers' reported information
on how well a pupil is "engaged in the classroom" and ﬁnd that controlling for this variable signiﬁcantly reduces
or completely removes the bias in teachers' grades, depending on pupils' ethnicity and the grade considered.
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focus on the sample of 2269 pupils for which punishments are non-missing10. This sample being
diﬀerent from the previous one, I run a balance check to verify if pupils' characteristics diﬀer. No
signiﬁcant diﬀerences are found regarding the blind score, non-blind score, gender and parents'
profession.11
Results are presented in table 4, column 2. Regressions are run in math only, where gender
discrimination is observed. To ensure that coeﬃcient comparisons are based on the same sample,
column 1 presents results of the standard DiD regression implemented on the new sample. The
coeﬃcient for discrimination decreases when I control for pupils' behavior, but the drop is very
small: the point estimate goes from 0.327 to 0.317. This suggests that in math, the gender
discrimination I observe cannot be explained by girls' better behavior than boys.12
Controlling for pupils' initial achievement. The second hypothesis I test is whether dis-
crimination in favor of girls partially captures two potentially related eﬀects: (1) some teachers'
might give more favorable grades to low-achievers and (2) in some classes the variance of teach-
ers' grades might be smaller than the variance of the standardized scores. Firstly, some teachers
might behave diﬀerently towards low-performers, and potentially give them higher grades than
expected by their ability. If this is the case, since girls perform lower than boys in math, what
I interpret as gender discrimination could partially capture a `low-achiever' positive discrimina-
tion. Secondly, some teachers might have a lower dispersion of their grades than the dispersion
of the standardized scores. For a given dispersion of blind scores in a classroom, reducing the
dispersion of non-blind scores will improve the non-blind score of the weakest in the class, rela-
tively to the scores of the best pupils. Again, since girls have initially lower scores than boys in
math, a teacher who prefers a reduced dispersion of his grades will advantage girls compared to
boys.
To test these hypotheses, I ﬁrst add controls for pupils' initial position in the blind grade
distribution. The new speciﬁcation includes dummy variables indicating whether pupils belong
to the lowest or highest decile of the blind score distribution. Scores are decomposed into deciles
within each subject and within class, meaning that pupils are ranked relatively to other children
in their class. Column 4 in table 4 presents results when a variable controlling for low achievers
is included (pupils below the 1st decile) and column 5 presents results with variables controlling
for both low and high achievers (pupils above the 9th decile). The point estimate of the gender
bias decreases by 7.5% when controls for low achievers are added to the regression  from 0.318
10The sample is the full sample, minus the pupils with a missing punishment
11Even if schools which do not provide information on sanctions are the one with the worst behaved students,
my results will be a lower bound of the eﬀect of pupils' behavior on the gender bias.
12A variable that controls for pupils' bad behavior is included but girls' behavior might also aﬀect non-blind
scores through more diﬀuse aspects (Cornwell et al. 2013): how they behave in the classroom, how often they
answer questions, the diligence they show in their work. I consider that these elements will not bias the results
as long as they are a component of my deﬁnition of girls. In this case, the coeﬃcient for gender discrimination
captures some characteristics that are intrinsically linked to girls.
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to 0.294 - suggesting that part of the gender bias in math captures an encouragement towards
low-achiever. The gender bias coeﬃcient further decreases (by 9.1% in total) when a dummy
variable for high achievers is added.13
Controlling for pupils' grade repetition. The third characteristic which might inﬂuence
teachers' grades and is not equally distributed for boys and girls is grade repetition. Among
pupils who have repeated a grade, 62.2% are boys. As previously, I include a dummy for grade
repetition in the regression. Results are presented in column 6 of table 4, and suggest that grade
repetition does not explain the positive bias in favor of girls14.
3.4 Robustness checks
3.4.1 Are both tests measuring the same abilities?
The DiD speciﬁcation discussed above rests on the restrictive assumption that both tests measure
the same abilities. However, if blind and non-blind scores do not measure exactly the same
abilities, and if these skills are not equally distributed between boys and girls, then failing to
take it into account will yield biased DiD estimates of gender discrimination. In equation (6),
the coeﬃcient α2 which I interpret as discrimination would partly capture girls or boys speciﬁc
ability in blind or non-blind scores. In this paper, I am careful about this concern since blind
tests are standardized tests created by the French Education Ministry, while non-blind grades
correspond to the average mark given every term by the teacher. They might measure slightly
diﬀerent abilities.
A way to test if both scores measure the same abilities is to directly estimate the reduced
form equation (5) in which no restrictive assumption is imposed on abilities, and to verify if the
coeﬃcient ρ is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one. If not, both tests can be assumed to measure
abilities which are perfectly correlated and DiD estimates can safely be assumed to be unbiased.
Due to measurement error, instrumental variables are used for this estimation. The method is
fully detailed in Appendix B.
As reported in table 13 of Appendix B, the IV estimate of the coeﬃcient of interest α2
equals 0.339 in math and 0.080 in French, which is very similar to the coeﬃcient obtained
by implementing DiD on the balanced sample  0.323 and 0.043 respectively. This conﬁrms
my results suggesting a bias in teachers' grades in favor of girls. Additionally, the purpose of
this estimation is to check whether both tests measure abilities which are perfectly correlated,
13As a second test, I run the regression on pupils' rank instead of pupils' test scores. Teachers' narrower or larger
dispersion of their grades does not aﬀect their pupils' ranking within the class. Hence running DiD regressions
with pupils' rank as a dependent variable is a mean to control for teachers' smaller/larger variance of grades.
Table 5 displays the coeﬃcients of these regressions, which I run on the initial whole sample containing 8329
observations in math and 8315 in French. Coeﬃcients are consistent with previous conclusions: the interaction
term equals -2.2 in math, meaning that girls' average rank decreases by 2.2 when they are assessed by their
teacher  going from 22 to 19.8 for instance.
14Finally, I test whether parents' profession has an impact on discrimination and ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of
pupils' social background.
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in other words if the IV coeﬃcient of the blind score is equal to one. This coeﬃcient ranges
from 0.964 in French to 1.090 in math and in both cases I cannot reject the hypothesis that
ρ = 1. This result suggests that the blind and non-blind tests measure skills that are perfectly
correlated, and hence that implementing double-diﬀerences gives unbiased estimates of a gender
bias. Hence, for further analysis, the DiD speciﬁcation will be used.
Finally, in the reduced form presented above: NBi = α0 + ρBi + α2Gi + (iNB + vi − ρiB),
I show in Appendix C that we can estimate how the OLS downward bias on ρ aﬀects the
estimation of our coeﬃcient of interest α2. Using the omitted variable bias formula, we can
easily show that the OLS downward bias on ρ creates a downward bias on α2 in math, but an
upward bias on α2 in French. This implies that the OLS estimate of α2 is a lower bound in
math. It remains high and signiﬁcant (equal to 0.264 in math and 0.172 in French) as reported
in table 13. This conﬁrms that in math a substantial bias exists in favor of girls. In French,
the coeﬃcient should be interpreted more carefully. The OLS estimate is an upper bound of the
gender bias. It suggests a positive eﬀect, but any other method aimed at reducing the bias (IV
or DiD) do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant gender bias.
3.4.2 Could girls progress more than boys between the date of the blind test and
the date of the non-blind?
Pupils take the standardized blind test during one of the ﬁrst days of the school year whereas
teachers' assessment is an average of several grades given by teachers during the ﬁrst term. Since
the ﬁrst term lasts three months, this average of several grades measures a pupils' average ability
about one and a half month after the beginning of the school year. This time lag between the
date of the blind and non-blind scores might be problematic if girls tend to progress more than
boys during this period. In particular, if teachers' biases in math appear early in the school year,
it might aﬀect girls' progress from the ﬁrst weeks of the school year. In this case, the coeﬃcient
which I interpret as a gender bias in math would be an upper bound for the true gender bias.
To address this concern, I use the data that have been collected at the end of the academic
year. Fortunately, the same scores have been collected - standardized tests and teachers' given
grades  but the time lag is reversed during the last term. Pupils take the standardized blind
test during one of the last days of the school year, while teachers' assessment is an average of
several grades given by teachers during the three last months. Hence, the blind test is taken
after the non-blind test. Under the same assumption that girls tend to progress more than boys
during this period, my estimates of gender discrimination during the third term would be a lower
bound. Computing the lower and upper bound of the estimates enables us to ﬁnd a plausible
interval for the gender bias.
I run the same DiD regression as before but with the third term scores. Then I compare the
estimates obtained during ﬁrst term (upper-bound) and last term (lower bound). The results
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are displayed in table 6. The same full sample is used for both regressions. Consistent with the
hypothesis that girls progress more than boys in math, the third term coeﬃcient (0.259) is lower
than the ﬁrst term coeﬃcient (0.318). The true value of gender discrimination is likely to be
between 0.259 and 0.318.
3.4.3 Could girls be more aﬀected by some unobserved shocks ?
The simple model deﬁned in section 3 contains three unobserved shocks: (1) iB corresponds to
an individual shock speciﬁc to blind scores, (2) iNB corresponds to an individual shock speciﬁc
to non-blind scores and (3) vi captures any speciﬁc ability measured by class exams but not
by standardized tests. The DiD estimates rest on the assumption that these shocks are equally
distributed for boys and girls15. However, if girls are systematically more stressed than boys
for standardized tests16, if they tend to be less eﬀective than boys in environments that they
perceive as more competitive (Gneezy et al 2003), if they tend to attach more importance to
national evaluations, or if they are more endowed in speciﬁc abilities measured by class exams17,
the restrictive assumption would be violated and the DiD estimates could be biased.
To take these shocks into account, I run triple-diﬀerences (Breda et al, 2013) which rest on
the following intuition: if girls systematically under-perform (or over-perform) for standardized
tests because of an unobserved shock and if this shock is equally distributed between subjects,
then girls should also have a lower blind than non-blind score in French. I do not observe
this. In French, the gap between the blind and non-blind score for girls is the same as the
one for boys. Comparing the coeﬃcient for discrimination in math and French, as I do here,
is equivalent to implementing within-gender between-subjects regressions  or triple diﬀerences.
This is a mean to control for any unobserved shock or characteristics that diﬀer across gender
but are assumed to be constant between subjects. Typically, triple diﬀerences allow vi to be
distributed diﬀerently for boys and girls, but within gender vi must be constant between French
and math18. The coeﬃcient for relative discrimination obtained with this method corresponds
to the coeﬃcient in math minus the one in French, hence 0.291 for the whole sample. I still
15In mathematical terms, this means that E(iNB |Gi = 1) = E(iNB |Gi = 0), E(iB |Gi = 1) = E(iB |Gi = 0)
and E(vi|Gi = 1) = E(vi|Gi = 0).
16If girls are more stressed than boys for standardized tests, they would tend to under-perform in this kind of
examination. My coeﬃcient of discrimination would be an upper bound for true gender discrimination. However,
a higher stress is unlikely because both tests are taken in the same conditions. Pupils take the standardized
test and their class exam in the same classroom where they sit usually, and it is their teacher who gives the
instructions. What is more, standardized tests are not high-stakes for the students. A pupil's test result is not
accounted for to compute his/her end of term average score.
17These abilities could recover short-term memory or learning an exercise by heart and replicating it the day
after for the class exam. McNally and Machin (2003) also suggest that the mode of assessment could aﬀect the
gender achievement gap.
18In mathematical terms, this means that E(vi,french|Gi = 1) = E(vi,math|Gi = 1) and E(vi,french|Gi = 0) =
E(vi,math|Gi = 0). This within-pupil between-subjects method controls for any characteristic speciﬁc to girls
that potentially aﬀect teachers' biases: the fact that girls behave better, might be more attentive, more serious,
more diligent.
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conclude that a positive bias exists in math in favor of girls.
4 Impact of discrimination on pupils' progress
The results on gender discrimination pave the way for a new set of questions related to the impact
of discrimination on pupils' subsequent achievement and subject choices at school. Positively
discriminating students might encourage them to make more of an eﬀort, and hence to increase
their scores. Reversely, if achievement and eﬀorts are substitutes, some students beneﬁting from
positive discrimination could provide less eﬀort, as they consider that they are good enough
(Benabou and Tirole, 2002). The dataset I use has the beneﬁt of containing blind scores at
three diﬀerent periods in time - at the beginning and at the end of the 6th grade, and at the
end of 9th grade - as well as information on pupils' subject choices during 11th grade.
4.1 Comparisons of girls and boys progress
Figures 11 and 12 plot the distribution of boys and girls progress between the ﬁrst and the
last term of grade 6, while graphics 13 and 14 plot the progress between 6th grade and 9th grade
- over the entire lower secondary school. I deﬁne progress as the diﬀerence between the blind
score at the ﬁnal period and the blind score at the beginning of 6th grade19.
Graphically, there is clear evidence that girls progress more than boys in mathematics,
whereas progress in French is similar. As reported in table 7, in math during the ﬁrst term
of 6th grade, girls' average score was 0.075 points below the mean. It is only 0.021 points below
the mean during the last term, and becomes 0.029 points above the mean by the end of the
9th grade - hence a total increase of 0.104 points of the s.d. Since girls' blind scores were lower
than boys' at the beginning of 6th grade, the fastest progress experienced by girls reduces the
gap between boys and girls blind scores. This catching up of girls in math raises the question
of the link between the positive bias in grades I observe in their favor in this subject and their
subsequent higher progress.
4.2 Model of pupil's progress
I deﬁne a simple model aimed at isolating the eﬀect of teachers' biased assessment on pupils'
progress. To begin with, I will keep the model as general as possible so that discrimination could
be considered towards any group of pupils. The main issue when evaluating the impact of grade
discrimination on a pupil's progress is to disentangle the pure eﬀect of grade biases from several
other determinants that might explain a pupil's high or low progress: how much of the progress
19The diﬀerence between the blind score at the end of the 6th grade and the one at the beginning of 6th grade
can be interpreted as a pupil's progress because both standardized tests measure the same abilities. They are
designed by the French Ministry of Education and aimed at measuring the same abilities at two diﬀerent periods
in time.
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is due to discrimination? How much is due to speciﬁc characteristics of the discriminated group?
For instance, girls might have an intrinsic tendency to progress more than boys over the school
year, without any discrimination. Similarly, low-achievers might have an initial higher propensity
to progress than high-achievers, again independently from any discrimination. Finally, I want to
take into account the fact that some teachers are more able than others to make their entire class
progress. Especially, biased teachers might share characteristics that make their pupils progress
more. The following model aims at isolating these various determinants of pupils' blind scores
evolution over the school year. Equation (8) below describes blind scores during ﬁrst term (as
deﬁned in section 2.1), while equation (9) describes blind scores during the third term (or any
later period20):
B1i = θ1i + B1i (8)
B3i = θ3i + B3i (9)
For the remaining of the model, all variables and parameters for third term are indexed by
3. A pupil's ability has changed between the ﬁrst and the last term. I model third term ability
as a function of the three eﬀects I want to disentangle: the eﬀect of discrimination, a pupil's
independent tendency to progress compared to the others and a teachers' eﬀect on progress:
θ3i = δθ1i + αGi + µiTi + βD1i + ωi (10)
Third term ability θ3i depends on three potential eﬀects: (1) a discrimination eﬀect caused by
teachers' biased assessment of their pupils: βD1i, where D1i corresponds to grade discrimination
during ﬁrst term. Its impact on pupils' third term ability is measured by the coeﬃcient β. It
is important to understand that this coeﬃcient captures several channels through which grade
biases can aﬀect a pupil's third term score. Motivation or discouragement are direct channels,
but eﬀort is also an important channel, as well as change in self-conﬁdence and reduction of
stereotypes threats. I will not be able to distinguish between these diﬀerent channels, that
are all captured by the coeﬃcient β. (2) Second, third term ability θ3i also depends on the
independent tendency to progress of the discriminated group, relatively to other pupils. This is
captured by the coeﬃcient α. In this general model, Gi is a dummy variable that equals one
for pupils belonging to the discriminated group. In a model where only gender discrimination
is considered, Gi would correspond to a girl dummy. (3) Finally, a pupil's progress is aﬀected
by his/her teacher's ability to make the entire class progress, where Ti is a teacher dummy.
Compared to the model of discrimination presented in section 3, I assume here that the blind
and non-blind tests measure the same abilities during the ﬁrst term. This assumption is based
on results obtained in the ﬁrst part. Following the ﬁrst robustness check, I could not reject the
hypothesis that both scores are measuring skills that are perfectly correlated.
20For the sake of simplicity, I model the progress between the ﬁrst and last term of grade 6, but the same
model remains valid for progress between the beginning of the 6th grade and any later period.
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In equation (10), I replace the coeﬃcient for discrimination D1i by NB1i − θ1i, which corre-
sponds to the diﬀerence between a pupil's ability and the non-blind grade attributed by his/her
teacher during the ﬁrst term. This corresponds to discrimination during the ﬁrst term. Equation
(10) becomes:
θ3i = δθ1i + αGi + µiTi + β(NB1i − θ1i) + ωi (11)
By replacing θ3i by its expression in equation (11) I obtain:
B3i = δθ1i + αGi + µiTi + β(NB1i − θ1i) + ωi + B3i (12)
Finally, replacing θ1i by its equation gives the following reduced form of the model:
B3i = (δ − β)B1i + βNB1i + αGi + µiTi + [ωi + B3i + (β − δ)B1i] (13)
This reduced form equation isolates the eﬀect of discrimination β, the discriminated group's
independent tendency to progress α, and µi the teacher's eﬀect. By rewriting it as below, the
interpretation of the coeﬃcients becomes straightforward: once controlled for a pupil's ability
B1i, for a group tendency to progress Gi, and for a teacher's average eﬀect Ti, the coeﬃcient β
of the diﬀerence between non-blind and blind scores captures the eﬀect induced by the fact that
a pupil receives a grade higher than expected by his/her ability:
B3i = δB1i + β(NB1i −B1i) + αGi + µiTi + (ωi + B3i + (β − δ)B1i) (14)
4.3 Identiﬁcation of girls' relative progress due to grade biases
The model deﬁned above is compatible with any kind of grade discrimination (related to gender,
ethnicity, achievement, behavior. . . ). To build upon the results found in part 1, I will focus
now on the identiﬁcation of girls progress (relative to boys) due to gender discrimination only.
Therefore, in equation (14), the group dummy Gi becomes a dummy for girls. The term discrim-
ination will always refer to gender biases in the rest of this section. The identiﬁcation strategy is
based on the observation that not all teachers discriminate, and that among teachers who have
a biased assessment of girls compared to boys, the degree of the bias also diﬀers across teachers,
with some teachers discriminating more than others. I take advantage of this heterogeneity in
the degree of discrimination to implement a between-class analysis. It is the variance in teach-
ers' discriminatory behavior that will identify the causal eﬀect of teachers' biased assessment
on pupils' achievement21. Graphically, this variance is represented by the horizontal axis of the
graphics 15 and 16. We want to test if classes in which girls beneﬁt from a high degree of dis-
crimination (relatively to boys) are also classes in which girls progress more (relatively to boys).
This identiﬁcation strategy can be seen as a DiD strategy, where the treatment corresponds to
21Lavy and Sand (2015) use a similar method to identify the eﬀect of teachers' stereotypical attitudes on boys
and girls progress separately.
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discrimination towards girls in some classes and the outcome is girls average third term blind
score compared to boys.
It is worth mentioning that the impact of gender discrimination I estimate with this spec-
iﬁcation captures diﬀerent elements. Teachers that tend to favor girls in their grades are also
likely to have a behavior towards girls that diﬀers from teachers who do not have biased grading.
Typically, they might be more encouraging, friendlier, focus more attention on girls, or be less
critical. The eﬀect of gender discrimination on progress will capture all these eﬀects. Even
without being able to separately identify these elements, it is interesting to know if teachers'
biased behaviors  with all elements it embeds  have an impact on girls' progress relative to
boys.
Graphics 15 and 16 provide a good insight into this question. For each class in the sample,
these graphs display the discrimination coeﬃcient and girls' progress relative to boys during the
6th grade. The discrimination coeﬃcient is deﬁned as the class average diﬀerence between the
non-blind and the blind scores for girls, minus this same diﬀerence for boys. It corresponds to
the estimate of gender discrimination obtained with the DiD in part 1. Girls' progress relative
to boys is measured as the diﬀerence between their blind score at the end of the year and this
blind score at the beginning of the year, minus this same diﬀerence for boys. Graphically, there
is clear evidence of a positive correlation between the degree of discrimination and the degree of
progress, and this is true in both French and math. It is also interesting to see that in part 1, the
results suggest that on average there is no discrimination in French. Graphic 16 clearly shows
that despite this null average, there is an important variance in teachers' biased assessments,
which might yield girls' higher or lower progress in these classes.
The identiﬁcation strategy is based on the comparison of mean scores between classes. Based
on equation 14, this requires aggregating scores at the class level for both girls and boys22 and
22 All variables are averaged conditionally to being a girl and having teacher Ti. Within a class, girls' average
third term blind score is given by:
E(B3i/Ti, Gi = 1) = δE(B1i/Ti, Gi = 1) + βE(NB1i −B1i/Ti, Gi = 1) + αE(Gi/Ti, Gi = 1)
+µiE(Ti/Ti, Gi = 1) + E(ωi/Ti, Gi = 1) + E(B3i/Ti, Gi = 1) + (β − δ)E(B1i/Ti, Gi = 1)
Symmetrically, boys' average score within a class is given by:
E(B3i/Ti, Gi = 0) = δE(B1i/Ti, Gi = 0) + βE(NB1i −B1i/Ti, Gi = 0) + αE(Gi/Ti, Gi = 0)
+µiE(Ti/Ti, Gi = 0) + E(ωi/Ti, Gi = 0) + E(B3i/Ti, Gi = 0) + (β − δ)E(B1i/Ti, Gi = 0)
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calculating the diﬀerence in progress between boys and girls in class c23:
(B3G −B3B)c = α+ δ(B1G −B1B)c + β[(NB1G −B1G)− (NB1B −B1B)]c + (ωG − ωB)c (15)
Equation 15 corresponds to the equation aggregated at the class level which I want to estimate
to identify the eﬀect of gender discrimination on progress. It is speciﬁed as a diﬀerentiation
between boys and girls average scores at the class level, so that teachers' eﬀects disappear; they
aﬀect similarly boys and girls within a class. The double diﬀerence at the right hand side of
the equation corresponds to the coeﬃcients for gender discrimination estimated in section 3 of
the paper  although here there is one coeﬃcient per class24. The coeﬃcient β identiﬁes the
eﬀect of being assigned a teacher who discriminates girls more or less  relatively to boys  on
girls' average third term blind score  relative to boys  once I control for the initial average
diﬀerence between boys and girls' blind scores. This coeﬃcient can be seen as a causal eﬀect
under the assumption that girls' assignment to a teacher who discriminates is quasi-random. In
other words, being assigned a teacher who discriminates is independent from girls' unobserved
characteristics ωi that make them potentially progress more than boys, once their initial level
is controlled for. I use the term quasi-random to describe the fact that pupils' assignment to
teachers is not done through a proper lottery. Yet, an arbitrary assignment of girls with high
predicted progress to teachers who discriminate is highly plausible for several reasons. Firstly,
pupils considered in this study are in 6th grade, which corresponds to the ﬁrst year of lower
secondary school. When deciding the composition of classes, school heads and teachers have
very little information on these new pupils, in particular it is very unlikely that they can predict
their progress, and therefore inﬂuence their assigned class and teacher. Secondly, assigning
teachers who discriminate to girls who have a high probability to progress more than boys
would necessitate that school heads know who the teachers are who discriminate girls, which is
again unlikely.
Although it is not possible to test this independence assumption, I test if the assignment to a
teacher who discriminates is independent from boys and girls observed characteristics. To do so,
I ﬁrst regress the discrimination coeﬃcient (deﬁned at the class level in both French and math)
on pupils' gender and ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect: girls are not more assigned to teachers with a
high bias than boys. This is true in French and math. Then, for both boys and girls separately,
23 Where to simplify notations:
B3G = E(B3i/Ti, Gi = 1), B3B = E(B3i/Ti, Gi = 0)...
ωG = E(ωi/Ti, Gi = 1) + E(B3i/Ti, Gi = 1) + (β − δ)E(B1i/Ti, Gi = 1)
ωB = E(ωi/Ti, Gi = 0) + E(B3i/Ti, Gi = 0) + (β − δ)E(B1i/Ti, Gi = 0)
24It is also worth noticing that in equation 15, assuming δ = 1 transforms it into a standard DiD equation:
(B3G −B3B)c − (B1G −B1B)c = α+ β[(NB1G −B1G)− (NB1B −B1B)]c + (ωG − ωB)c
where the coeﬃcient β obtained corresponds to the slopes of regressions lines displayed in graphics 16
and 17. For the remainder of the analysis, I use equation 15 which requires less restrictive assumptions.
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I successively regress the discrimination coeﬃcient (in math and in French) on the following
set of variables : having upper class parents, having lower class parents, having repeated a
grade. I ﬁnd that these observed characteristics are independent from being assigned a teacher
with a high level of bias. The only exception is that boys with upper class parents are slightly
less likely to be assigned a teacher who discriminates in math, and that girls having repeated
a grade are less likely to be assigned a teacher who discriminates in French. Finally, I argue
that being assigned a teacher who discriminates is independent from girls' and boys' averaged
random shocks aﬀecting blind scores during ﬁrst and last term. As long as these shocks recover
pure testing noise  being ill the day of the exam for instance - it is plausible that they are
independent from teachers' assignment 25.
This between-class comparison has three advantages compared to an estimation of parame-
ters with individual observations based on equation 13. First, comparing classes rules out the
issue of girls' potential higher stress than boys for blind tests. Here the double-diﬀerences na-
ture of equation 15 implies that any eﬀect that is common to all classes disappears. As long
as pupils' assignment to teachers who discriminate is independent from their unobserved char-
acteristics that make them progress more, then girls with higher stress for standardized tests
should be equally distributed between classes. A second concern when analyzing discrimination
and progress with individual observation is the potential for reversed causality caused by the
fact that teachers might discriminate more pupils they believe have an ex-ante high potential for
progress. In my setting, the arbitrary assignment of pupils implies that those with an ex-ante
high potential for progress should be equally distributed between classes. Hence, comparing
classes rules out this problem. Finally, averaging scores at the class level reduces signiﬁcantly
the measurement error aﬀecting blind score when measured at the individual level.
4.4 Balance check of the attrition
Three diﬀerent outcomes are used to estimate the causal eﬀect of teachers' gender biases on
girls' relative progress : the blind score at the end of 6th grade, the blind score at the end of 9th
grade and pupils' subject choices during 11th grade. Not all the pupils could be followed over
the long term, so two types of attrition exist : (1) an attrition at the class level when scores
are missing for all pupils in a class and (2) an attrition at the individual level when within a
class scores are missing for some pupils. Attrition is not problematic as such. Yet, if attrition
at the class level is more important for classes with high (or low) discrimination degree, this
could bias my estimate. To test this, I regress the dummy variable for missing classes on the
25The identiﬁcation I use is based on the heterogeneity in teachers' discriminatory behaviors between diﬀerent
classes. It is equivalent to implement an IV strategy based on equation 13, where the term (NB1i −B1i) would
be instrumented by all the interactions between teachers and girls at the class level. These interactions measure
teachers' biased grading in favor of girls. The assumption detailed above - pupils' assignment to a teacher who
discriminates is random - is analogous to an exclusion restriction on these instrumental variables.
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discrimination coeﬃcient26. Results are presented in table 8. Classes included in the analyses of
the short-term and long-term progress do not diﬀer regarding the discrimination degree of their
teachers. Second, I test if the percentage of girls or boys missing in a class is correlated to the
degree of bias of their teacher. To do so, I regress the percentage of girls (per class) on the gender
bias. This is done successively for boys and girls. As previously, for each gender, six diﬀerent
regressions are run corresponding to the six columns of the table. Results are presented in table
9. Out of twelve coeﬃcients, eleven are statistically non signiﬁcant, suggesting that attrition of
boys and girls is independent from teachers' gender biases.
4.5 Empirical results on girls' progress relative to boys
4.5.1 Short term progress during the 6th grade
The ﬁrst regression is based on equation 15. The key result (reported in table 10) suggests that
in math, classes in which teachers present a high degree of discrimination in favor of girls, are
also classes in which girls tend to progress more over one school year compared to boys. The
coeﬃcient is high (0.281) and signiﬁcant in math. In a class where boys and girls would have
on average the same initial blind score, positively rewarding girls by increasing their non-blind
score by one s.d compared to boys, would increase the gap between boys and girls third term
blind score by 0.28 s.d. This eﬀect is substantive, but we should keep in mind that the treatment
is also important : increasing teachers' bias by one s.d represents approximatively an increase
from the minimum to the maximum value of the bias. It might be more relevant to interpret
this coeﬃcient in light of the ﬁrst part results. An average discrimination coeﬃcient of 0.31 was
found in math, which implies that, proportionally, girls' third term blind score would increase
by 0.089 points - or 1.7% - compared to boys27. This eﬀect of teachers' biases on progress during
the 6th grade is observed in math but no signiﬁcant eﬀect is observed in French over the short
term, partly because the standard-error of the estimate is high.
26Six diﬀerent regressions are run for each missing variable : blind score in French and math at the end of
the sixth grade, blind score in French and math at the end of the ninth grade, and information on course choice
during the eleventh grade (regressed on discrimination in both French and math).
27We should be careful when interpreting the coeﬃcient and keep in mind that the outcome is relative. It
corresponds to the diﬀerence between girls and boys scores, so that the positive coeﬃcient I ﬁnd could correspond
to a higher progress for girls than for boys, or a blind score that remains constant for girls between ﬁrst and last
term but decreases for boys (due to their feeling of being negatively discriminated compared to girls for instance).
Lavy and Sand (2015) provide evidence that teachers' biases in favor of boys have an asymmetric eﬀect on boys
and girls. Boys achievement increases while girls' achievement is negatively aﬀected.
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4.5.2 Long-term progress until the 9th grade
Beyond the short-term eﬀect, it is interesting to see if the eﬀect of teachers' gender biases during
the 6th grade persists over the long term, and if the girls favored by their teachers continue
to catch up boys in math. To answer this question, I analyze pupils' progress until grade 9,
hence four years after the gender bias is observed. The same speciﬁcation is used and results are
reported in columns 3 and 4 of table 10. Teachers' gender biases during grade 6 have a high and
signiﬁcant long-term eﬀect on girls' progress relative to boys, in both math and French. Once
controlled for the achievement gap between girls and boys at the beginning of the lower secondary
school, increasing girls' grades by 1 s.d compared to boys will increase the gender achievement
gap at the end of lower secondary school by 0.375 points in math and 0.421 in French. As
previously, the magnitude of this eﬀect can be interpreted with regard to the average gender
bias found in the ﬁrst part of the analysis. For the average estimate of teachers' bias, girls'
long term achievement would increase by 0.116 s.d in math and 0.131 in French, compared to
boys. This long-term eﬀect observed in French is interesting. It shows that despite the fact that
we found no average bias in teachers' grades, there exists an important variance in teachers'
discriminatory behaviors which has an eﬀect on girls' relative progress.
To build upon these results, it is interesting to see whether the catching up of girls that
we observe in math, ﬁrst during the 6th grade, and then until the 9th grade, would still have
occurred without the gender discrimination. The descriptive statistics presented in table 2 show
that, in math during third term the gap between girls and boys blind score equals -0.041 points
of the s.d, while it equals -0.147 during ﬁrst term. This represents a relative improvement of
girls compared to boys of 0.106 s.d. My results suggest that, in the absence of a gender bias,
the achievement gap during third the term would have been equal to -0.130 instead of -0.041,
therefore a relative improvement of girls of 0.017 instead of 0.106. Hence, in the absence of
discrimination, girls would not have progressed more than boys during the 6th grade. The
catching up we observe in math during the 6th grade is almost entirely driven by the positive
eﬀect of the gender discrimination on girls' progress. Following the same reasoning, it is easy to
show that, over the long term, about half of girls catch-up of boys is caused by teachers' biased
behavior in math28.
4.5.3 Eﬀect of teachers' biases on course choice
I ﬁnally test if teachers' biases in favor of girls aﬀect the type of high school and courses they chose
compared to boys. The 9th grade corresponds to the last grade of the lower (and compulsory)
28The calculus is as follows : the descriptive statistics presented in table 2 show that, in math at the end of
the 9th grade, the achievement gap between girls and boys blind score equals +0.058 points of the s.d, while it
is -0.147 at the beginning of the 6th grade. This represents a relative improvement of girls compared to boys of
0.205 points of the s.d. My estimates show that due to teachers' biases, girls' long term achievement relative to
boys increase by 0.116 points of the s.d in math. This represents a little bit more than half of girls' total relative
progress.
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secondary school. After this grade, pupils can chose between a vocational, technical or general
high school, the latter being chosen by the majority as it provides the most opportunities to
continue studies at university. In our sample, 50.9% of the girls choose a general high school and
40.3% of boys. For the pupils who decided to attend a general high school, everyone attends the
same courses during the 10th grade, but pupils have to specialize when they enter the 11th grade.
Three options are available to them: sciences, humanities or economics and social sciences. In
this sample, among girls in general high school, 32.8% chose the scientiﬁc course, while 40.2%
of the boys did so. This reversal of the gender probability is striking as the scientiﬁc path is
the most prestigious one, and the one that leads to higher education in science, technology,
engineering and math (STEM) ﬁelds. These ﬁelds of studies are highly gender unbalanced in
most countries. Therefore, it would be interesting to know if favoring girls is a mean to ﬁght
these persistent gender diﬀerences.
Using the same speciﬁcation as before, I successively analyze the eﬀect of teachers' discrim-
inatory behavior during the 6th grade on three outcomes: girls' relative probability to attend a
general highschool, to chose a scientiﬁc course and to repeat a grade. Results are presented in
table 11. The dependent variable is the diﬀerence between girls and boys probability to attend
a general highschool in grade 10 (columns 1 and 2), to chose a scientiﬁc course in grade 11
(columns 3 and 4) or to repeat one of the grades between grade 6 and grade 11 (columns 5 and
6).
First, I ﬁnd that being assigned a teacher who favors girls in the 6th grade increases girls' rela-
tive probability to attend a general highschool (rather than a professional or technical one) by
0.15 percentage points when the discrimination is in a math course and 0.16 percentage points
when the discrimination is in French. Knowing that on average in this sample, girls are 10.6%
more likely than boys to attend a general highschool, the magnitude of the eﬀect is very high
: it multiplies by two girls higher probability than boys to chose a general highschool. This
eﬀect is however in line with Lavy and Sand (2015) who ﬁnd that "the estimated eﬀect of math
teachers' stereotypical attitude [in favor of boys] on enrollment in advance studies in math is
positive and signiﬁcant for boys (0.093, SE=0.049) and negative and signiﬁcant for girls (-0.073,
SE=0.044)". This signiﬁcant eﬀect is also consistent with the preceding result on girls higher
progress than boys until grade 9. The likelihood that a pupil attends a general highschool in
grade 10 is highly correlated to his/her results at the end the lower secondary school (grade 9).
Second, the results reported in columns 3 and 4 suggest that teachers' biases positively aﬀect
girls' relative probability to chose a scientiﬁc course during the 11th grade. As previously, this
eﬀect is observed whether the gender bias is in French (+0.095) or in math (+0.107). Although
the coeﬃcients are positive, it is interesting to notice that they are signiﬁcantly lower than the
preceding ones (on the probability to chose a general highschool). This observation is inter-
esting because the scientiﬁc path is the most prestigious one, and the one that leads to higher
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education in STEM ﬁelds. Although rewarding girls make them progress more (compared to
boys) and attend more general highschool, this suggests that girls still face barriers that prevent
them from increasing in the same proportion their likelihood to chose scientiﬁc courses. I am
not able to provide evidence on the existence of such barriers, but recent papers show that low-
income students are less likely to apply to prestigious and high-achieving college, hence creating
an academic "undermatch"29. Since 68% of the pupils in this sample have low SES parents,
this mechanism is relatively plausible. Finally, teachers' biased behavior slightly decreases girls
relative probability to repeat a grade in math, but not in French.
All together, the positive eﬀect of teachers biases on both girls' relative progress and schooling
decisions is consistent with diﬀerent mechanisms mentioned in prior literature. Firstly, positively
rewarding girls can reduce the stereotype threat eﬀect. In situations where stereotypes are
perceived as important, some girls have been proved to perform poorly for the sole reason that
they fear conﬁrming the stereotypes (Spencer et al. 1999). If math is perceived by girls as more
aﬀected by teachers' stereotypes, over-grading girls in this subject can reduce their anxiety to be
judged as poor performers, and therefore favor their progress. Over the short term, the fact that
biases aﬀect girls' relative progress in math but not in French is consistent with a reduction of
the stereotype threat, which might be more prevalent in math than in French. My ﬁndings are
also consistent with prior research highlighting a `contrast eﬀect' according to which a student's
academic self-concept is positively inﬂuenced by his or her individual achievement, but negatively
aﬀected by other peers-average achievement - usually composed of peers in the classrooms - once
controlled for individual achievement (Trautwein et al. 2006, Marsh and Craven, 1997). With
regard to this contrast eﬀect, giving higher grades to girls would have a twofold eﬀect: from an
absolute point of view, higher grades will positively aﬀect girls' self-concept, and self-conﬁdence
in math, and from a relative point of view, girls' higher grades compared to boys will reduce
the achievement gap between boys and girls, and therefore increase girls relative academic self-
concept. Finally, my result tends to challenge Mechtenberg's (2009) theoretical predictions
according to which girls are reluctant to internalize good grades in math, because they believe
their grades are biased.
5 Conclusion
In most OECD countries, at the earliest stage of schooling, boys outperform girls in mathemat-
ics, but they underperform in humanities. Then over the school years, this achievement gap
tends to vanish in math but persist in French. This paper studies how teachers biased grades
can explain both the achievement gap between boys and girls and its evolution over time. I use
data containing both blind and non-blind scores at diﬀerent periods in time to identify, ﬁrst the
eﬀect of teachers' stereotypes on their grades, and second the eﬀect of biased rewards on pupils'
progress and course choice. Firstly regarding discrimination, my results suggest that an impor-
29See for instance Hoxby and Avery 2013, Smith et al. 2013, Dillon et al. 2013.
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tant positive discrimination exists in math towards girls, while no bias is observed in French.
This gender bias cannot be explained by girls' better behavior than boys. However it partially
captures girls' initial lower achievement in math. Regarding the impact of discrimination on
girls' progress relative to boys, I observe that classes in which teachers present a high degree
of discrimination in favor of girls during the 6th grade, are also classes in which girls tend to
progress more compared to boys. This is true over the short and long term, hence suggesting
a positive eﬀect of rewards on girls' relative progress. Teachers' biases also aﬀect girls relative
likelihood to attend a general high school during the 10th grade (rather than a professional
or technical one) and to choose a scientiﬁc course during grade 11. These results provide new
empirical evidence on gender discrimination in grades and how it aﬀects the gender achievement
gap over the short term and long term.
I am however unable to disentangle the diﬀerent channels through which a gender bias can
aﬀect girls' relative achievement. On the one hand, positively rewarding pupils could motivate
them, make them increase their eﬀorts, increase their self-conﬁdence, and reduce the stereotype-
threat they suﬀer from. On the other hand, if pupils consider eﬀort and abilities as substitutes,
a higher grade might be an incentive to reduce eﬀort and work. Unfortunately, I am not able to
disentangle these eﬀects that might compensate or reinforce each other. This is an interesting
question for future research. Another concern is the external validity of my results. In this study,
I use a dataset that has been collected in schools of a relatively deprived educational district.
This must be considered for issues of external validity of this analysis. Teachers assigned to
deprived areas are on average younger than teachers in more advantaged schools, and we have
seen that unexperienced teachers are more biased. Similarly, pupils in these areas might face
more constraints (ﬁnancial or self-censorship) regarding their schooling decisions.
Finally, this analysis provides several policy-relevant results regarding teachers grading.
First, my ﬁndings suggest that marks given by teachers do not reﬂect only pupils' ability. They
are aﬀected by pupils' characteristics or attitudes. This raises the question of the relevance
of some elements included in grades. Should a grade reﬂect a pupil's gender, his/her initial
achievement, or behavior? The answer is not clear and seems to depend on the objective pur-
sued. On the one hand, if grades are wished to measure only a pupil's ability, then the inﬂuence
of a pupils' gender seems problematic, especially since several important decisions in school life
are made on the basis of student grades (choice of stream at the beginning of upper secondary
school, whether to repeat a year, choice of subject paths, etc). A simple and non-costly policy
to remedy gender biases would consist of informing teachers about conscious or unconscious
stereotyping and its potential eﬀects on the grades that they give. French teachers have cur-
rently neither training nor information provided on the risks they face of judging their students
through the lens of stereotypes. Making them aware of these risks might be a simple solution
to signiﬁcantly reduce biases in grades. Considering that teachers biases are problematic is also
related to the ongoing debate on the use of grades as evaluation tools. The earlier teachers give
grades to students, the higher the potential for discrimination. In several education systems,
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pupils do not receive any grades before they turn 11 or more (Sweden for instance). On the
other hand, grades could be considered as an instrument with which teachers improve student
progress. In this case, teachers' grades could be a way to reduce the inequalities in achievement
between boys and girls, by encouraging girls in math and boys in French to eliminate their lag.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and balance check of the attrition
Full Sample with Sample with
Sample no missing missing
Mean Mean Mean Diﬀerence p-value
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)=(3)-(2)
Test scores
Blind t1 - French -0.000 0.013 -0.270 -0.283*** (0.000)
Blind t1 - Math 0.000 0.011 -0.240 -0.251*** (0.000)
Non-Blind t1 - French 0.000 0.021 -0.426 -0.447*** (0.000)
Non-Blind t1 - Math -0.000 0.018 -0.335 -0.354*** (0.000)
Pupils' characteristics
% Girls 0.481 0.490 0.411 -0.079*** (0.000)
% Grade repetition 0.062 0.054 0.118 0.063*** (0.000)
% Disciplinary warning 0.062 0.061 0.077 0.016*** (0.000)
% Excluded from class 0.056 0.052 0.089 0.037*** (0.000)
% Temporary exclusion from school 0.036 0.038 0.020 -0.018*** (0.000)
Parents' characteristics
% High SES 0.178 0.182 0.143 -0.040*** (0.000)
% Low SES 0.686 0.699 0.589 -0.109*** (0.000)
% Unemployed 0.117 0.109 0.181 0.072*** (0.000)
Teachers' characteristics
% Female teachers - Math 0.499 0.492 0.551 0.059*** (0.000)
% Female teachers - French 0.846 0.848 0.829 -0.019*** (0.000)
Teachers' age - Math 34.378 34.240 35.407 1.167*** (0.000)
Teachers' age - French 37.942 38.235 35.748 -2.487*** (0.000)
Number of observations 4490 3964 526
† Notes: Stars correspond to the following p-values: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. The full sample contains 4490
pupils. The sample with no missing scores during ﬁrst term contains 3964 pupils. 526 observations are considered
as missing since one test score at least is missing during ﬁrst term.
This table presents the diﬀerences between the sample with no test score missing and the sample with missing
scores. The fourth column "Diﬀerence" reports the coeﬃcients of the regression of various dependent variables on
a dummy indicating that the pupil has a score missing. All scores are standardized. Standard errors are robust.
Parent's profession: Parents belong to the category high SES if they belong to the French administrative category
"corporate manager" or "executive". Parents are classiﬁed as low SES if they belong to the categories worker"
or white-collar worker". For both variables, the dummy takes the value 1 if at least one of the parents belongs
to the category.
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Table 2: Comparison between boys' and girls' test scores
Girls Boys
# obs Mean # obs Mean Diﬀ p-value
Score Period Subject (1) (2) (3)=(1)-(2)
Blind Grade 6 - t1 Mathematic 2020 -0.075 2127 0.072 -0.147*** (0.000)
French 2022 0.223 2135 -0.211 0.434*** (0.000)
Grade 6 - t3 Mathematic 1754 -0.021 1804 0.020 -0.041*** (0.000)
French 1761 0.202 1814 -0.196 0.398*** (0.000)
Grade 9 Mathematic 1828 0.029 1781 -0.029 0.058*** (0.000)
French 1841 0.223 1799 -0.228 0.451*** (0.000)
Non-Blind Grade 6 - t1 Mathematic 2042 0.087 2140 -0.083 0.170*** (0.000)
French 2024 0.236 2134 -0.224 0.460*** (0.000)
Grade 6 - t3 Mathematic 2029 0.112 2127 -0.107 0.218*** (0.000)
French 2008 0.234 2104 -0.224 0.458*** (0.000)
† Notes: All tests scores are standardized. Column (1) displays mean scores of girls in mathematics and
French, by nature of grading (blind scores at the top and non-blind scores at the bottom), and by period
(successively : ﬁrst term of 6th grade, third term of 6th grade and 9th grade). Column (2) presents the
same results for boys. Column (3) corresponds to the diﬀerences between girls' and boys' scores.
Distribution of Blind and Non-Blind scores (Grade 6 - t1)  French
Figure 1: Blind score Figure 2: Non-Blind score
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Distribution of Blind and Non-Blind scores (Grade 6 - t1)  Math
Figure 3: Blind score Figure 4: Non-Blind score
Evolution of the distribution of Blind scores  French
Figure 5: Grade 6 - t1 Figure 6: Grade 6 - t3 Figure 7: Grade 9
Evolution of the distribution of Blind scores  Math
Figure 8: Grade 6 - t1 Figure 9: Grade 6 - t3 Figure 10: Grade 9
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Table 3: Estimation of the gender bias using Double-Diﬀerences
Balanced Sample Full sample
Math French Math French
Dep var : Scores
Girls -0.164*** 0.411*** -0.152*** 0.426***
(0.028) (0.019) (0.028) (0.018)
Non-Blind Score -0.153** -0.019 -0.156** -0.011
(0.053) (0.045) (0.052) (0.045)
Girl x Non-Blind 0.323*** 0.043 0.318*** 0.027
(0.026) (0.031) (0.027) (0.032)
Constant 4.740*** 3.672*** 2.361*** 0.450***
(0.045) (0.027) (0.133) (0.117)
Class FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.116 0.159 0.118 0.158
Number of observations 8136 8116 8329 8315
Notes: The dependent variable is the score (both blind and non-blind) ob-
tained by a pupil in French or math during the ﬁrst term. Standard-errors
are in parentheses and have been estimated with school level clusters. Stars
correspond to the following p-values: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.
Each pupil has two observations: one for the blind score and one for the
non-blind. The balanced sample contains 4068 pupils in math and 4058 in
French for which both the blind and non-blind scores are non-missing. The
full sample contains 4519 pupils. Some of them do not have two observations
if the blind or non-blind score is missing.
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Table 4: Double-Diﬀerences with control variables for pupils' characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep var : Math scores
Girls -0.146** -0.211*** -0.152*** -0.133*** -0.086** -0.160***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Non-Blind Score -0.170* -0.147* -0.156** -0.191** -0.148* -0.150**
(0.064) (0.067) (0.052) (0.054) (0.057) (0.051)
Girl x Non-Blind 0.327*** 0.317*** 0.318*** 0.294*** 0.289*** 0.313***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027)
Controls for punishment .
Punishment -0.566***
(0.076)
Punishment x Non-Blind -0.153*
(0.071)
Punishment x Non-Blind x Girl -0.301
(0.157)
Controls for initial achievement . .
Decile 1 -1.625*** -1.465***
(0.039) (0.040)
Decile 1 x Non-Blind 0.248*** 0.229***
(0.059) (0.060)
Decile 1 x Non-Blind x Girl 0.245*** 0.203**
(0.067) (0.067)
Decile 10 1.491***
(0.028)
Decile 10 x Non-Blind -0.331***
(0.036)
Decile 10 x Non-Blind x Girl -0.019
(0.050)
Controls for grade repetition .
Grade repetition -0.352***
(0.090)
Repetition x Non-Blind -0.076
(0.133)
Repetition x Non-Blind x Girl 0.077
(0.112)
Constant 4.717*** 5.034*** 2.361*** 2.631*** 1.853*** 2.492***
(0.062) (0.067) (0.133) (0.134) (0.138) (0.127)
Class FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.105 0.136 0.118 0.313 0.461 0.125
Number of observations 4413 4413 8329 8329 8329 8329
Notes: Standard-errors are in parentheses and have been estimated with school level clusters. Stars correspond to the
following p-values: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. The dependent variable is the score (both blind and non-blind)
obtained by a pupil in math during ﬁrst term. The full sample is used in columns 3 to 5. The sample used in columns
1 and 2 is the full sample, to which pupils for which a punishment variable is missing have been removed.
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Table 5: Estimation of the gender bias with
pupils' rank as dependant vaariable
Math French
Dep var : Ranks
Girls 1.193*** -2.806***
(0.204) (0.179)
Non-Blind Score 1.289*** 0.339**
(0.101) (0.110)
Girl x Non-Blind -2.247*** -0.430*
(0.177) (0.175)
Constant 2.521*** -4.617***
(0.241) (0.141)
Class FE Yes Yes
R2 0.048 0.091
Number of observations 8329 8315
Notes: The dependent variable is the rank (both
blind and non-blind) of a pupil in math during ﬁrst
term. Standard-errors are in parentheses and have
been estimated with school level clusters. Stars
correspond to the following p-values: * p<.05; **
p<.01; *** p<.001. All tests scores are standard-
ized.
Table 6: Comparison of DiD estimates of
the gender bias for ﬁrst and last term
Math French
(1) (2)
Coef Girl*Non-Blind 0.318 0.027
First term ( 0.027) (0.032)
Coef Girl*Non-Blind 0.259 0.064
Last term (0.035) (0.040)
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Table 7: Evolution of test scores between the ﬁrst term of grade 6 and later periods
Grade 6 - t1 Later period
# obs Mean # obs Mean Diﬀ t-stat
Later period Subject Gender (1) (2) (3)=(2)-(1)
Grade 6 - t3 Mathematic Girls 2020 -0.075 1754 -0.021 0.054 1.717
Boys 2127 0.072 1804 0.020 -0.051 -1.563
French Girls 2022 0.223 1761 0.202 -0.021 -0.674
Boys 2135 -0.211 1814 -0.196 0.015 0.458
Grade 9 Mathematic Girls 2020 -0.075 1828 0.029 0.104 3.311
Boys 2127 0.072 1781 -0.029 -0.101 -3.068
French Girls 2022 0.223 1841 0.223 0.000 0.011
Boys 2135 -0.211 1799 -0.228 -0.017 -0.552
† Note: All tests scores are standardized. Column (1) presents the mean blind score obtained by boys and
girls during the ﬁrst term of 6th grade. Column (2) presents the mean blind scores during a later period
(third term of 6th grade or 9th grade). Column (3) is the diﬀerence between the second column and the
ﬁrst column.
Boys and girls' progress over the 6th grade
Figure 11: French Figure 12: Math
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Boys and girls' progress over the entire lower secondary school
Figure 13: French Figure 14: Math
Correlation between teachers' gender bias and girls' relative progress during the 6th grade.
Figure 15: French Figure 16: Math
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Table 8: Balance check of the attrition at the class level
Grade 6 - t3 Grade 9 Grade 11
Math French Math French Math French
Dep var: Class missing
Discrimination 0.041 -0.001 0.043 0.006 0.058 0.016
(0.085) (0.066) (0.062) (0.018) (0.055) (0.016)
Number of observations 189 189 189 189 189 189
† Notes: Stars correspond to the following p-values: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. One
observation per class. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to
one if all blind scores are missing in a class at the end of grade 6. In columns 3 and
4, the dummy equals one if the blind score at the end of the 9th grade are missing. In
columns 5 and 6, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a pupil's course
choice during the 11th grade is missing. The diﬀerence between column 5 and 6 lies
in the subject aﬀected by discrimination (math in column 5 and French in column 6).
Robust standard-errors.
Table 9: Balance check of the attrition for boys and girls
Grade 6 - t3 Grade 9 Grade 11
Math French Math French Math French
Dep var: % girls missing
Discrimination 0.028 -0.010 0.010 0.004 0.073 -0.004
(0.080) (0.066) (0.044) (0.038) (0.056) (0.042)
Dep var: % boys missing
Discrimination 0.064 0.077 0.110* 0.059 0.005 0.051
(0.073) (0.062) (0.051) (0.032) (0.028) (0.030)
Number of observations 189 189 189 189 189 189
† Notes: Stars correspond to the following p-values: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. One
observation per class. Respectively in the upper and bottom part of the table, the depen-
dent variable corresponds to the percentage of girls (resp boys) with a missing score. In
columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the percentage of girls (resp boys) for which
the blind score is missing at the end of grade 6 (blind score missing in math in column 1
and French in column 2). In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the percentage of
girls (resp boys) for which the blind score is missing at the end the 9th grade. In columns
5 and 6, the dependent variable is the percentage of girls (resp boys) for which course
choice during the 11th grade is missing. Robust standard-errors.
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Table 10: Eﬀect of the gender discrimination on girls' progress relative to boys
Progress over 1 year Progress over 4 years
Math French Math French
Dep var : End of period (BG −BB)c
Gender bias - Grade 6 - t1 0.281** 0.169 0.375*** 0.421***
(0.079) (0.100) (0.093) (0.091)
Gender achievement gap - Grade 6 - t1 0.878*** 0.864*** 0.611*** 0.692***
(0.065) (0.113) (0.057) (0.066)
Constant -0.010 0.025 0.029 0.141**
(0.037) (0.055) (0.040) (0.044)
R2 0.548 0.423 0.327 0.335
Number of observations 175 171 186 186
† Notes: The unit of observation is a class. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the gap
between girls and boys third term blind score. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the gap
between girls and boys score obtained at the end of the 9th grade national evaluation. The right
hand side variable "Gender bias - Grade 6 - t1" corresponds to [(NB1G−B1G)− (NB1B−B1B)]c.
The variable "Gender achievement gap - Grade 6 - t1" corresponds to (B1G − B1B)c. Standard-
errors are in parentheses and have been estimated with school level clusters. Stars correspond to
the following p-values: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Regressions are weighted by class-size.
Table 11: Eﬀect of the gender discrimination on girls' course choice and grade repetition relative to boys
General training Scientiﬁc course Grade repetition
Math French Math French Math French
Dep var : End of period (ProbG − ProbB)c
Gender bias - Grade 6 - t1 0.153** 0.163** 0.107** 0.095* -0.097* -0.061
(0.044) (0.048) (0.031) (0.040) (0.038) (0.040)
Gender achievement gap - Grade 6 - t1 0.233*** 0.297*** 0.166*** 0.160*** -0.104** -0.107*
(0.035) (0.036) (0.026) (0.028) (0.035) (0.041)
Constant 0.084** -0.035 -0.014 -0.076*** -0.067*** -0.032
(0.027) (0.022) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019)
R2 0.182 0.212 0.165 0.113 0.055 0.039
Number of observations 188 188 188 188 188 188
† Notes: The unit of observation is a class. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the gap between girls' and
boys' probability to chose a general track from grade 10. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the gap between
girls' and boys' probability to chose a scientiﬁc track in grade 11. In columns 5 and 6, the dependent variable is the
gap between girls' and boys' probability to repeat a grade. The right hand side variable "Gender bias - Grade 6 - t1"
corresponds to [(NB1G−B1G)− (NB1B −B1B)]c. The variable "Gender achievement gap - Grade 6 - t1" corresponds to
(B1G − B1B)c. Standard-errors are in parentheses and have been estimated with school level clusters. Stars correspond
to the following p-values: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Regressions are weighted by class-size.
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A Appendix
Do teachers' characteristics aﬀect the gender bias ?
Contrary to prior research that ﬁnd that girls tend to beneﬁt from discrimination in all subjects
(Lindhal 2007, Lavy 2008, Robinson and Lubienski 2011, Falch and Naper 2013, Cornwell et al.
2013), these results suggest that girls are favored only in math. To explain this diﬀerence, it is
interesting to focus our attention on some characteristics of the teachers that could inﬂuence their
grading practices, and that would be diﬀerent for maths and French teachers. Both teachers'
gender and their experience respect these two conditions. As displayed in table 1, while in math
the share of men and women teachers is the same, the pattern is very diﬀerent in French where
85% of the teachers are female. Similarly, math teachers are on average 3.5 years younger than
French teachers.
Several studies show that the interplay between student and teacher gender plays a role in
teachers' assessment (Dee 2005, Falch and Naper 2013, Lavy 2008, Ouazad and Page 2012, Lind-
hal 2007). To test if teachers' gender explain their discriminatory behavior, I run the previous
DiD regressions separately on the sub-sample of male and female teachers. I ﬁnd that teachers'
gender has no eﬀect on teachers discriminatory behavior in French, and a small and non sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerence in math. In this subject, female teachers' grades are less biased in favor of
girls than male teachers' grades: the average gender bias equals 0.294 for women teachers and
0.343 for male teachers, but this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant30. These estimates decomposed by
teachers experience are displayed in the graphic below.
Figure 17: Discrimination coeﬃcient by teachers' gender and years of experience
30My ﬁndings are in line with Falch and Naper (2013) who ﬁnd a limited or no eﬀect of teachers' gender on
the gender bias in grades. They do not conﬁrm Lavy (2008) whose results suggest that all the gender bias in
math is driven by male teachers.
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Second, I test if teachers' experience aﬀects the gender bias. To do so, I decompose the
sample into three groups of teachers depending on their experience : ﬁrst year of experience,
two to ﬁve years, and more than ﬁve years. This focus on the ﬁrst years of experience results
from the young average age of the teachers in this sample: 58.1% of the math teachers have 5 or
less years of experience, 45% for French teachers. I run the DiD regression on each of the three
samples. The results suggest that in mathematics, teachers in their ﬁrst year of teaching are
more biased than more experienced teachers : the average gender bias represents 0.571 points
of a s.d for new math teachers versus 0.295 for teachers with more than ﬁve years of experience.
In French, teachers' experience has no eﬀect on their gender biases.
B Appendix
Estimation of the gender bias if the blind and non-blind scores do not measure the
same abilities.
In mathematical terms the assumption that both tests measure the same ability is equivalent
to ρ = 1 and vi = 0 in equation (3) deﬁned in section 3.1: θ2i = ρθ1i + vi. If we release this
hypothesis, we are back to the reduced form equation presented previously:
NBi = α0 + ρBi + α2Gi + (iNB + vi − ρiB)
A way to test the validity of the hypothesis is to directly estimate the reduced form equation
above and to verify if the coeﬃcient ρ is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one. If not, both tests can
be assumed to measure abilities which are perfectly correlated and DiD estimates can safely be
assumed to be unbiased31. However to correctly estimate the parameter ρ in this equation, I
have to get rid of the measurement error bias on Bi. Since Bi is a noisy measure of ability θ1i,
it is correlated to the measurement error iB. I solve this endogeneity issue by instrumenting
Bi. A pupil's month of birth is used as an instrument that is correlated to his/her blind score
but independent from the error term.
In the literature, students' month of birth has been shown to be an important determinant
of pupils' success at school (Crawford et al. 2007, Bedard and Dhuey 2006 and Grenet 2012).
I test the correlation between blind scores and pupils' month of birth by running a regression
of blind scores in French and math on a set of 11 dummies for each month of birth. January
is taken as the reference month so that all coeﬃcients should be interpreted relatively to this
month. Figure 18 presents the correlation coeﬃcients.
31I will discuss in a further section an additional assumption required for the DiD to be unbiased. Although
we cannot test whether vi = 0, the term vi should be equally distributed between boys and girls.
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Figure 18: Correlation between pupil's month of birth and the blind score.
Table 12: First stage - Correlation between blind
score and being born at the end of the year
Math French
Dep var : Blind t1
Born End of Year -0.150*** -0.173***
(0.041) (0.040)
Girl -0.177*** 0.386***
(0.042) (0.041)
Punishment -0.469*** -0.522***
(0.071) (0.067)
Grade repetition -0.323** -0.204*
(0.099) (0.082)
High SES 0.410*** 0.412***
(0.055) (0.053)
Constant 0.137*** -0.149***
(0.039) (0.038)
R2 0.060 0.112
Number of observations 2175 2127
F stat 14.12 18.01
Notes: The dependent variable is the blind score ob-
tained by a pupil in during ﬁrst term. Standard-errors
are in parentheses. Stars correspond to the following
p-values: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. All tests
scores are standardized.
There is clear evidence that pupils born at the end of the year have lower results than
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those born at the beginning of the year. From this observation, and to avoid including too
many instrumental variables in the equation, I create dummy variable for pupils born after July.
Results of the ﬁrst stage regression are displayed in table 12. Once controlled for covariates,
being born at the end of the year has an important negative eﬀect on blind scores  0,150
points of the s.d in math and 0,173 in French. The F-stat reported at the bottom of the table
corresponds to the stat obtained when the blind score is regressed on the instrument only.
Being born at the end of the year will be a valid instrument if the following exclusion
restriction holds: the only reason why a pupil's month of birth aﬀects teachers' grades is because
being born at the end of the year impacts his ability  measured by the blind score  once
controlled for other covariates. In other words, being born at the end of the year is uncorrelated
to the random shocks that enter the error term of equation (5): iNB + vi − ρiB. I claim this
restriction is valid, provided that I control for pupils' behavior, parents' profession and grades
retention, three variables that might be correlated to being born at the end of the year. The
reduced form equation (5) is estimated, ﬁrst with standard OLS, and second by instrumenting
the blind score. Results are presented in table 13 and commented directly in the paper.32
Table 13: OLS and IV estimates of the reduced form
OLS IV
Math French Math French
Dep var : Non-Blind score
Blind score 0.760*** 0.684*** 1.090*** 0.964***
(0.019) (0.031) (0.100) (0.099)
Girl 0.264*** 0.172*** 0.339*** 0.080
(0.028) (0.043) (0.032) (0.057)
Constant -4.794*** -9.031*** -7.617*** -11.585***
(0.190) (0.309) (0.846) (0.896)
Class FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.687 0.607 0.594 0.549
Number of observations 2175 2127 2175 2127
p-val(Blind=1) 0.37 0.72
Notes: Standard-errors are in parentheses and have been estimated with school
level clusters. Stars correspond to the following p-values : * p<.05; ** p<.01;
*** p<.001. The unit of observation is a pupil. The sample contains 2175 pupils
in math for which the blind score, non-blind score and punishment variable are
non-missing, 2127 in French. The instrument is a dummy variable equal to one if
a pupil is born between July and December.
Control variables included : grade repetition, punishment and high SES.
32As previously, all regressions include class ﬁxed-eﬀects. They are run on a sample that contains 2175 pupils
in math for which the blind score, non-blind score and punishment variable are non-missing, and 2127 in French.
Standard errors are estimated with school level clusters to take into account common shocks at the school level.
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Finally, regarding the exclusion restriction, some might argue that once controlled for the
abilities measured by the blind score, being born at the end of the year is not perfectly in-
dependent from unobserved speciﬁc skills vi tested by the non-blind score only. If this is the
case, it is likely that being born at the end of the year would also be negatively correlated with
these unobserved skills. Therefore the IV estimates of ρ might be an upper bond for the true
value of ρ, while the OLS would be a lower bound (due to the downward measurement error
bias). Indeed, the IV estimate is ρIV =
Cov(NBi,EndY eari)
Cov(Bi,EndY eari)
. If a correlation exists between vi and
being born at the end of the year, this would aﬀect the numerator of the formula by increasing
Cov(NBi, EndY eari). Hence ρIV would be an upper bound for the parameter ρ.
C Appendix
Measure of the omitted variable bias aﬀecting ρ and α2.
Since girls perform initially lower than boys in mathematics, and higher in French, the blind
score is correlated to a pupils' gender. The downward bias on ρ could aﬀect the estimate of α2.
Using the formula of the omitted variable bias allows me to determine the direction of the bias
that aﬀects both ρ and α2 (Bouguen, 2014).
The well-known formula of the omitted variable bias is :
E(b1/X) = β1 + (X
′
1X1)
−1X ′1X2β2 (16)
where X1 is a vector of the observed variables, X2 is a vector of the unobserved variables,
β1 is the vector of the estimated coeﬃcients of the observed variables, and β2 is the vector of
the coeﬃcients of the unobserved variables.
In my setting, the observed variables are the blind score Bi and a pupil's gender Gi, and the
unobserved variable is the error term aﬀecting the blind score Bi :
X1 =

B1 G1
B2 G2
...
...
Bn Gn
 , β1 =
(
ρ
α2
)
, X2 =

B,1
B,2
...
B,n
 , β2 = −ρ
In the following, I simplify notations as follows:
∑N
i=1 =
∑
and Bi = Ei
Hence :
(X ′1X1) =
( ∑
B2i
∑
BiGi∑
BiGi
∑
G2i
)
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(X ′1X1)−1 =
1∑
B2i
∑
G2i−(
∑
BiGi)2
( ∑
G2i −
∑
BiGi
−∑BiGi ∑B2i
)
(X ′1X2) =
(∑
BiEi∑
GiEi
)
(X ′1X1)−1(X ′1X2) =
1∑
B2i
∑
G2i−(
∑
BiGi)2
(∑
G2i
∑
BiEi −
∑
BiGi
∑
GiEi∑
B2i
∑
GiEi −
∑
BiGi
∑
BiEi
)
(X ′1X1)−1(X ′1X2)β2 =
1∑
B2i
∑
G2i−(
∑
BiGi)2
(
−ρ∑G2i ∑BiEi + ρ∑BiGi∑GiEi
−ρ∑B2i ∑GiEi + ρ∑BiGi∑BiEi
)
The ﬁrst row gives the bias which aﬀects the estimates of the coeﬃcient of Bi. The second
row corresponds to the bias on the coeﬃcient α2 of the variable Gi :
E(αˆ2) = α2 − ρ
∑
B2i
∑
GiEi −
∑
BiGi
∑
BiEi∑
B2i
∑
G2i − (
∑
BiGi)2
(17)
Dividing both the numerator and denominator by n2, gives :
E(αˆ2) = α2 − ρV (Bi)Cov(Gi, Ei)− Cov(Bi, Gi)Cov(Bi, Ei)
V (Bi)[V (Gi)− G¯i]− Cov(Bi, Gi)2 (18)
Dividing both the numerator and denominator by V (Bi)V (Gi)σEi gives:
E(αˆ2) = α2 − ρ
r(Gi,Ei) − r(Gi,Bi)r(Bi,Ei)
1 + G¯iV (Bi) − r2(Bi,Gi)
σEi
σGi
(19)
where σEi is the standard deviation of Ei, σGi is the standard deviation of Gi, r(Gi,Ei) is the
correlation coeﬃcient between Gi and Ei, r(Bi,Ei) is the correlation coeﬃcient between Bi and Ei
and G¯i is the mean of the variable Gi.
Being a girl is assumed to be orthogonal to the shock aﬀecting the blind score so that
r(Gi,Ei) = 0:
E(αˆ2) = α2 + ρ
r(Gi,Bi)r(Bi,Ei)
1 + G¯iV (Bi) − r2(Bi,Gi)
σEi
σGi
(20)
Based on this formula, the direction of the bias depends on the sign of each of its elements:
ρ is the correlation coeﬃcient between the blind score and the non-blind score. It is positive.
By deﬁnition, standard deviation and variances are also positive, as is the average value of the
dummy Gi. Finally, we can easily show that r(Bi,Ei) is positive
33. Hence, the direction of the bias
33 In a standard measurement error model r(Bi,Ei) =
Cov(Bi,Ei)
σBiσEi
= V (Bi)
σBiσEi
=
σEi
σBi
> 0
45
is fully determined by the sign of r(Gi,Bi). This is the correlation coeﬃcient between Gi and Bi.
It is positive in French, where girls perform higher than boys for the standardized evaluation,
and negative in mathematics where they perform lower at the beginning of the 6th grade. This
means that in math, the estimate of the coeﬃcient αˆ2 is a lower bound for the true value of α2.
In French the estimate is an upper bound.
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